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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PANAMA 05265

SECSTATE FOR ACDA AND AID

E.O. 11562: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, XX
SUBJECT: INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

REF: (A) STATE 167901, (B) STATE 168320, (C) STATE
182987

SUMMARY: THIS ASSESSMENT REFLECTS A U.S. PERCEPTION OF
PANAMA'S FORCE DEVELOPMENT GOALS. THEIR MILITARY PLANNING
TOWARD THESE GOALS IS BELIEVED TO BE BASED ALMOST ENTIRELY
ON ANTICIPATED USE OF THE TREATY-RELATED UNDERTAKING OF THE
U.S. TO PROVIDE FMS CREDIT GUARANTEES OF \$50 MILLION OVER A
TEN-YEAR PERIOD. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF PANAMA'S CURRENT ECO-
NOMIC PROBLEMS, CONCERN OVER THE REVIVAL OF DOMESTIC POLIT-
ICAL ACTIVITY, AND PREOCCUPATION WITH PLANNING FOR THEIR
INVOLVEMENT IN OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE CANAL AND
FOR THEIR TAKEOVER AND UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES IN THE
CANAL ZONE, IT APPEARS THAT MOST DEFENSE AND SECURITY
PLANNING HAS REMAINED IN THE CONCEPTUAL STAGE. SINCE IT IS
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EVIDENT THAT THEY HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE GOOD FAITH
AND ABILITY OF THE U.S., AS "SENIOR" DEFENSE PARTNER, TO
WORRY ABOUT DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF THE CANAL, THEY APPAR-
ENTLY FEEL NO REAL URGENCY ABOUT PROCEEDING RAPIDLY WITH
FORCE DEVELOPMENT. ALTHOUGH THIS ASSESSMENT POSTULATES A
FORCE DEVELOPMENT PLAN BEGINNING WITH FY80, WHEN THE NEW
TREATIES ENTER INTO FORCE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE OTHER

MATTERS CLAMORING FOR PANAMA'S GOVERNMENT RESOURCES AND FOR THE ATTENTION OF ITS LEADERSHIP MAY LEAD THEM TO POSTPONE OR STRETCH OUT SIGNIFICANT FORCE DEVELOPMENT ACTIONS. OUR PERCEPTION IS THAT THERE IS LITTLE QUESTION OF WHAT GENERAL TYPE AND LEVEL OF FORCE DEVELOPMENT OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE SHOULD SUPPORT; ON THE CONTRARY, THE MAJOR UNKNOWNNS APPEAR TO BE WHEN, HOW FAST, AND IN WHAT ORDER PANAMA WILL DECIDE TO DEVELOP THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE PROJECTED FORCE, WITHIN THE \$50 MILLION/TEN YEAR CONSTRAINTS. IT IS THUS VERY DIFFICULT AT THIS TIME TO DEAL WITH SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROJECTIONS FOR PANAMA ON A SHORT-RUN, YEAR-BY-YEAR BASIS.

1. 3A(1). US INTEREST IS IN THE SECURE, UNINTERRUPTED, AND EFFICIENT USE OF THE PANAMA CANAL. THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY MAKES THE US AND PANAMA RESPONSIBLE FOR COMBINED DEFENSE OF THE CANAL. US SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES FOR PANAMA ARE TO:

A. PREPARE THE PANAMANIAN NATIONAL GUARD (GN) TO ASSUME AN EXPANDED ROLE IN THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF THE CANAL.

B. ENHANCE GN MILITARY CAPABILITIES THROUGH FORCE DEVELOPMENT, TRAINING, AND MODEST UPGRADING OF EQUIPMENT.

2. 3A(2). PANAMA'S LEADERS DO NOT PERCEIVE ANY SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL THREAT TO THEIR SECURITY AS LONG AS THERE IS CONFIDENTIAL

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A U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE ALONG THE PANAMA CANAL. THE ONLY INTERNAL THREAT THEY PERCEIVE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF UNREST AND DISORDER GENERATED BY THE RETURNED EXILES, REACTIVATED POLITICAL PARTIES, AND RADICAL STUDENTS AS THESE ELEMENTS VIE FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND POWER. THEIR STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE THREAT IS CREATION OF A GOVERNMENT POLITICAL PARTY AND MAINTENANCE OF EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT BY THE GN FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD IN THE CONTEXT OF A REFORMED POLITICAL SYSTEM ALLOWING FOR A LEGAL OPPOSITION.

3. 3A(3). WE CONCUR WITH PANAMA'S PERCEPTION OF THE SECURITY THREAT. CUBA, HOWEVER, WITH AN ACTIVE MISSION IN PANAMA, MIGHT CHOOSE TO GO FARTHER THAN PANAMA APPARENTLY EXPECTS TO EXPLOIT ANY INTERNAL PROBLEMS IN AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE DISSENSION, DISRUPT GOVERNMENT CONTROL, AND PROMOTE INSTABILITY.

4. 3A(4). NATIONAL GUARD LEADERS APPARENTLY BELIEVE THEIR NATIONAL POLICE/PARAMILITARY STRUCTURE WITH SOME UPGRADING IS SUFFICIENT TO MEET EXISTING REQUIREMENTS AND ANY THREAT WHILE THE US PRESENCE CONTINUES. THEY APPEAR TO BE PLANN-

ING FOR EVENTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF A LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE OF NOT MORE THAN THREE BATTALIONS, SUPPORTED BY A SMALL, TRANSPORT-ORIENTED AIR FORCE AND A SMALL COASTAL PATROL AND LIGHT CARGO-CAPABLE NAVY. PRESENT GUARD LEADERS SEEM RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY STEPS TO INCREASE THEIR STRICTLY MILITARY CAPABILITY FOR FEAR THESE ACTIONS WOULD ADD WEIGHT TO THE OPPOSITION'S CHARGES AGAINST THE "MILITARY DICTATORSHIP." ADDITIONALLY, BATTALION OR BRIGADE-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS COULD COME TO REPRESENT A THREAT TO THE EXISTING LEADERSHIP. ACCORDINGLY, INITIAL FORCE DEVELOPMENT ACTIONS MIGHT FAVOR THE LESS POTENTIALLY THREATENING NAVAL AND AIR

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FORCE ELEMENTS, WHICH CAN ADDITIONALLY SERVE IN NATION-BUILDING PROJECTS AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISOLATED AREAS. CONCENTRATING ON PURCHASE OF AIR AND NAVAL EQUIPMENT COULD DELAY ORGANIZING AND EQUIPPING OF "REAL" BATTALIONS, AS OPPOSED TO "PAPER" BATTALIONS WHOSE ELEMENTS ARE WIDELY DISPERSED, BUT IT MAY MAKE SENSE IN TERMS OF PANAMA'S LACK OF ADEQUATE TRANSPORT AND COAST GUARD CAPABILITY.

5. 3A(5). THE THREE-BATTALION LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE SUPPORTED BY A SMALL AIR FORCE AND NAVY APPEARS TO BE A REASONABLE GOAL FOR PANAMA WITH ITS LIMITED RESOURCES. THE LIGHT INFANTRY ORIENTATION IS REALISTIC IN VIEW OF THE LOW-LEVEL THREAT AND CURRENT PANAMANIAN CAPABILITIES. PANAMA MAY BE SLOW TO CONDUCT THE REORGANIZATION REQUIRED TO MAKE THE NATIONAL GUARD MILITARILY EFFECTIVE FOR THE REASONS MENTIONED IN THE PRECEEDING PARAGRAPH. GUARD REORGANIZA-

TIONAL CHANGES, WHEN THEY ARE MADE, WILL PROBABLY BE MADE INCREMENTALLY AND GRADUALLY; THERE WILL BE A CONSOLIDATION PERIOD AFTER EACH CHANGE TO INSURE THE CHANGES MADE REPRESENT NO THREAT TO THE INFLUENCE OR POWER OF THE TORRIJOS GOVERNMENT (OR SUCCEEDING MILITARY-DOMINATED GOVERNMENTS).
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6. 3A(6). ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE SPENDING. IN PANAMA, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES ARE NOT BEING DIVERTED FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES. OUTLAYS FOR DEFENSE OF ABOUT \$15.0 MILLION IN 1978 AMOUNT TO LESS THAN 1 PER CENT OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND ABOUT 2 PER CENT OF THE CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC BUDGET. THUS, THE IMPACT OF DEFENSE SPENDING ON PANAMA'S ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS IS SMALL IN TERMS OF ITS CLAIM ON THE COUNTRY'S FINANCIAL RESOURCES. NEVERTHELESS, MILITARY EXPENDITURES MUST COMPETE WITH OTHER NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR LIMITED AVAILABLE FUNDS, AND THUS MAY BE DEFERRED.

ANY UPGRADING OF THE NATIONAL GUARD'S DEFENSE CAPABILITY AS IT TAKES OVER INCREASED RESPONSIBILITIES FROM THE U.S. MILITARY FOR SECURING THE CANAL COULD NOT TAKE PLACE RAPIDLY ENOUGH TO RAISE THE DEFENSE PORTION OF GDP TO 2 PER CENT ANYTIME SOON. BY WORLD STANDARDS, EVEN 2 PER CENT OF GDP FOR DEFENSE WOULD BE VERY LOW AND COMPARE FAVORABLY TO THE 5 PER CENT "REASONABLENESS" TEST USED IN IMPLEMENTING SECTION 620(S) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT.

OTHER NON-FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF PANAMA'S DEFENSE EFFORT SUCH AS POSSIBLE MANPOWER AND TRAINING DRAIN, DO NOT HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT BECAUSE OF THE SMALL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED AND THE RELATIVELY LOW SKILL LEVELS REQUIRED AT THE NATIONAL GUARD'S PRESENT LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT.

7. 3A(7). THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROJECTION SHOWN BELOW REPRESENTS A ONE-YEAR SLIPPAGE FROM THAT SHOWN IN THE FY80-84 MSAP. ACQUISITIONS ORIGINALLY PROGRAMMED FOR FY79 HAVE BEEN MOVED TO FY80, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE DELAY IN TREATY EFFECTIVE DATE TO 1 OCTOBER 1979. SIMILAR SLIPPAGE MAY IN
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FACT BE EXPERIENCED THROUGHOUT THE TEN-YEAR PERIOD FOR WHICH FMS CREDIT IS TO BE PROVIDED, BASED ON PANAMA'S OWN PERCEPTIONS OF ITS NEED AND ABILITY TO PROCEED WITH ACTUAL FORCE DEVELOPMENT.

PROJECTION OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES

FY80 FY81 FY82

1ST BATTALION BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS 2D BATTALION
(\$2.6 MILL) (\$5 MILL) (\$2.4 MILL)

2-LCU (\$3.5 MILL) 2-LCM8 (\$1 MILL) 2-LCM6 (\$.6 MILL)
2-FPB (\$1.6 MILL) 2-FPB (\$1.7 MILL) 1-LCM8 (\$.5 MILL)
2-32' PB (\$.1 MILL) 1-C-130 (\$11.1 MILL) 2-FPB (\$1.8 MILL)

8. 3A(10). ARMS CONTROL IMPACT. PROJECTED ACQUISITIONS
ARE MODEST AND UNSOPHISTICATED AND SHOULD HAVE NO EFFECT
ON REGIONAL ARMS STABILITY.

9. 3A(11). HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS. SEVERAL SIGNIFI-
CANT DEVELOPMENTS IN PANAMA'S HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION HAVE
TAKEN PLACE IN THE LAST YEAR, DUE IN PART TO PRESSURES
EXERTED ON THE GOVERNMENT BY THE U.S., VISITING SENATORS,
AND LOCAL OPPOSITIONISTS IN THE COURSE OF THE PANAMA CANAL
TREATY DEBATE:

--MORE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION HAS BEEN ALLOWED.

--REPRESSIVE LAWS WERE REPEALED WHICH LIMITED FREEDOM OF
ASSEMBLY AND DENIED THE RIGHT TO HABEAS CORPUS IN CERTAIN
CASES.

--ALL POLITICAL EXILES, INCLUDING ARNULFO ARIAS--THE FORMER
PRESIDENT OUSTED IN THE 1928 COUP WHICH BROUGHT TORRIJOS

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INTO POWER--HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO RETURN TO PANAMA.
--POLITICAL PARTIES, WHICH ARE ANTI-GOVERNMENT AND ANTI-TORRIJOS, HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO VOICE THEIR OPINIONS AND TO ORGANIZE AND CARRY OUT THEIR ACTIVITIES, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE STILL ILLEGAL, STRICTLY SPEAKING.

WHILE THESE DEVELOPMENTS NEITHER AFFECT THE NATIONAL GUARD DIRECTLY NOR RELATE DIRECTLY TO THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, THEY COULD NOT HAVE TAKEN PLACE WITHOUT THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN THE PERSONS OF GENERAL TORRIJOS AND THE GENERAL STAFF.

THE GUARD IS NOT POLITICALLY POPULAR WITH MANY PANAMAN- IANS, AND COMPLAINTS OF "HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS" (MAINLY POLICE BRUTALITY) ARE OCCASIONALLY HEARD AND SOMETIMES APPEAR TO BE JUSTIFIED. THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO SYSTEMATIC VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS; THE GUARD'S RECORD OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS HAS BEEN GOOD.

AS WAS STATED IN THE FY1979 ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN PANAMA, WE DOUBT THAT PROVIDING
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EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM WILL HAVE MUCH IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS HERE.

10. 3A(12). ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO PANAMA FROM OTHER SOURCES TAKES THE FORM PRIMARILY OF LOANS. THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK IS THE MAJOR LENDER AND FINANCES THE BULK OF THE PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAM--IN CY 1977, \$24 MILLION FOR TOURISM DEVELOPMENT, AND \$98 MILLION FOR THE FORTUNA HYDROELECTRIC POWER PROJECT. (OTHER SIGNIFICANT LENDERS INCLUDE THE WORLD BANK, VENEZUELA, AND EXTERNAL PRIVATE SOURCES.)

SMALL AMOUNTS OF ASSISTANCE ARE PROVIDED BY INTER-NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: IN 1977, THE U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PROVIDED \$500,000 IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND IN THE PERIOD 1976-78, THE OAS WILL BE PROVIDING \$1.2 MILLION.

IN ADDITION, SCHOLARSHIPS AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ARE MADE AVAILABLE BY A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES--THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ISRAEL, ITALY AND MEXICO. SOME TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PERSONNEL ARE PROVIDED BY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, PRIMARILY CUBA, WHICH AS OF FEBRUARY 1978 HAD 60 TECHNICIANS IN PANAMA IN CONNECTION WITH AGRICULTURAL AND FISHING PROGRAMS. ACADEMIC TRAINING IS ALSO PROVIDED IN THE USSR AND EASTERN

EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES INVOLVES SOME SMALL PURCHASES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT (I.E., SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION) AND SENDING A LIMITED NUMBER OF PERSONNEL TO OVERSEAS SCHOOLS. IN ADDITION, MOST INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE GN'S OFFICER CORPS ARE GRADUATES OF VARIOUS LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY ACADEMIES.

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11. 3A(13 A-E). IN CONSIDERING LEVELS LESS THAN THAT PROPOSED IN D. BELOW, WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THE COMMITMENT TO PANAMA UNDERTAKEN IN SECRETARY VANCE'S NOTE OF 7 SEP 77 TO AMBASSADOR LEWIS.

A. LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM LEVEL)

IMET: \$.25 MILL

FMS FINANCING: \$.5 MILL

(1) DESCRIPTION. THIS LEVEL IS SUFFICIENT TO UNDERTAKE ONLY MINIMUM PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NATIONAL GUARD. IT WILL PERMIT THE PURCHASE OF SOME COMMAND AND CONTROL EQUIPMENT OR A SMALL NAVAL CRAFT (LCM OR PB).

(2) RISK/BENEFIT. TRAINING OF THE CADRE FOR THE FIRST BATTALION WILL BE DELAYED AND THE AIR FORCE AND NAVAL ELEMENTS WILL NOT RECEIVE BADLY NEEDED TRAINING. PANAMA WILL NOT BE ABLE TO EQUIP ITS FIRST BATTALION NOR UPGRADE ITS EXISTING AIR AND NAVAL ARM. NO UNFAVORABLE HUMAN RIGHTS CONSEQUENCES ARE FORESEEN.

B. LEVEL 2 (INTERMEDIATE)

IMET: \$.4 MILL

(1) DESCRIPTION. WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNICAL TRAINING.

(2) RISK/BENEFIT. PERMIT GREATER LEVEL OF COOPERATIVE TRAINING WITH GUARD PERSONNEL.

C. LEVEL 3 (CURRENT LEVEL)

IMET: \$.5 MILL

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(1) DESCRIPTION. WILL PROVIDE FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT TRAINING IN BOTH CANAL ZONE SCHOOLS AND IN CONUS. WILL ENABLE GN TO PURCHASE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT FOR ITS FIRST BATTALION AND POSSIBLY AN LCM OR PB FOR THE NAVAL ARM.

(2) RISK/BENEFIT. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WILL PERMIT THE GN TO DEVELOP A JUNIOR OFFICER AND NCO CADRE FOR ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF THEIR PROPOSED FORCE STRUCTURE. IT WILL ALLOW A GRADUATED EXPANSION OF THEIR PRESENT CAPABILITIES. FMS CREDIT WILL ALLOW FOR THE PARTIAL EQUIPPING OF THE FIRST BATTALION AND WILL ENABLE THE GN TO UPGRADE ITS NAVAL CAPABILITY. THERE IS NO ADVERSE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT.

D. INCREMENTAL LEVEL
IMET: \$.75 MILL
FMS FINANCING: \$7.8 MILL

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(1) DESCRIPTION. IMET FUNDING WILL ALLOW THE GN TO EXPAND THEIR JUNIOR AND MID-LEVEL OFFICER TRAINING THROUGH INCREASED ENROLLMENT IN CANAL ZONE AND CONUS SCHOOLS AND MORE USE OF MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS. FMS TRAINING LEVEL IS THAT AMOUNT REQUIRED TO MEET THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROJECTION IN PARA 7.

(2) RISK/BENEFIT. IMET FUNDING WILL PERMIT EXPANDED TRAINING FOR NAVAL AND AIR SECTIONS AND IMPROVE THE PROFESSIONALISM OF THE GN. FMS CREDIT LEVEL WILL ALLOW FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF THE NAVAL ARM IN COMBATING DRUG TRAFFIC AND SMUGGLING AS WELL AS ADDITIONAL ASSETS FOR NATION BUILDING. FUNDING LEVEL WILL ENABLE THE FIRST BATTALION TO BECOME OPERATIONAL AND BEGIN TO FULFILL ITS ROLE IN SHARED DEFENSE OF THE CANAL. NO ADVERSE HUMAN RIGHTS CONSEQUENCES ARE FORESEEN.

12. 3A(13-F). MANNING.

A. LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM). 6 MILITARY, 2 U.S. CIVILIAN, 2 LWR.

JUSTIFICATION. MANNING AT THIS LEVEL CONSTITUTES DE FACTO DISSOLUTION OF THE MILGP AND ITS SUBSTITUTION BY A "TYPE" OFFICE OF DEFENSE COOPERATION PERFORMING SECURITY ASSISTANCE ACCOUNTING AND OTHER MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS. ABILITY TO PROVIDE NEEDED ASSISTANCE TO PANAMA IN DETAILED DEVELOPMENT OR IMPLEMENTATION OF FORCE DEVELOPMENT PLANS WOULD BE SHARPLY LIMITED, AS WOULD ABILITY TO CONTINUE THE NON-INTELLIGENCE LIAISON AND REPRESENTATION FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY MILGP IN THE ABSENCE OF A DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE.

B. LEVEL 2 (INTERMEDIATE). 9 MILITARY, 1 U.S. CIVILIAN, 1 LWR.

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JUSTIFICATION. MANNING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD PERMIT CONTINUATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS AND MODEST ASSISTANCE TO PANAMA IN DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF FORCE DEVELOPMENT PLANS. NON-INTELLIGENCE LIAISON AND REPRESENTATION FUNCTIONS PERFORMED IN THE ABSENCE OF A DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE COULD CONTINUE AT ABOUT PRESENT LEVELS, BUT ABILITY OF MILGP TO ASSIST ACTIVELY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW COOPERATIVE CANAL DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US AND PANAMANIAN FORCES WOULD BE MINIMAL.

C. LEVEL 3 (CURRENT). 13 MILITARY, 1 U.S. CIVILIAN, 1 LWR.

JUSTIFICATION. MANNING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD PERMIT CONTINUATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS, GREATER ROUTINE ASSISTANCE TO PANAMA IN DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF FORCE DEVELOPMENT PLANS, NON-INTELLIGENCE LIAISON AND REPRESENTATION FUNCTIONS PERFORMED IN THE ABSENCE OF A DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE, AND ACTIVE ASSISTANCE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW COOPERA-

TIVE CANAL DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US AND PANAMANIAN FORCES.

D. LEVEL 4 (INCREMENTAL LEVEL). NO SPECIFIC MANNING LEVEL IS PROPOSED. INCLUSION IS TO SUGGEST THE POSSIBLE NECESSITY FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL, PROBABLY ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT A DECISION SHOULD BE REACHED TO PROCEED WITH THE ENTIRE FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM ON AN ACCELERATED, BROAD-FRONT BASIS, IN WHICH CASE PANAMA WOULD DEFINITELY REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN ON-THE-SCENE ADVISORY ASSISTANCE. THIS COURSE IS NOT

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ADVOCATED, BUT COULD, THROUGH SOME CIRCUMSTANCES NOT NOW FORESEEN, BECOME NECESSARY. JORDEN

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